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NOTES
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO HUBBARD v.
UNITED STATES: RESTORING THE SCOPE OF
18 U.S.C. § 1001 AND CODIFYING THE
"JUDICIAL FUNCTION" EXCEPTION
Although the authority to create federal legislation rests solely with
Congress,' the Supreme Court possesses the ultimate power to interpret
this legislation.2 These two distinct functions naturally conflict, often re-
sulting in the need for one branch to correct the actions of the other.3 For
example, the Court may determine a congressional enactment unconstitu-
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives."). Congress has enacted legislation in the past, however, that arguably dele-
gates something similar to lawmaking power to the executive branch. See generally Abner
S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
123, 124 (1994) (arguing that Congress's delegation of regulatory powers to the Executive
branch results in the President having de facto "lawmaking" powers far exceeding those
envisioned by our Founding Fathers).
2. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). There are many
instances, however, where the executive and congressional branches, as well as state gov-
ernments, have challenged the basis on which the presumptive power of the judiciary as
ultimate arbiter is founded. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
586-89 (1952) (holding that the president does not have the authority to seize the nation's
steel mills without explicit congressional approval of such action); Ex parte McCardle, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-14 (1869) (accepting congressional power to revoke the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction over certain subject matter); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 351-52 (1816) (affirming the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
over state supreme court decisions when a federal law is at issue). There are scores of
cases, treatises, and articles that examine the historical foundation of judicial review in
America. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:
THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888 chs. 3-4 (1985) (analyzing the origins of judicial
review and federal jurisdiction); GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 1 (10th ed. 1980) (analyzing the nature and sources of Supreme Court
authority); 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE chs. 1-2 (2d ed. 1992) (same).
3. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Inter-
pretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (providing a thorough analysis of congres-
sional responses overriding Supreme Court decisions from 1967-1990).
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tional and, therefore, invalidate the legislation.4 In comparison, Congress
may overrule the Court by passing a more precise law to cure any defect
that may have led the Court to rule against the imperceptible or impre-
cise intent of Congress.'
Most disputes between these two branches of government, however, do
not reach constitutional proportions. Many disagreements simply con-
cern congressional intent and the Court's statutory interpretations. 6 This
4. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free
School Zones Act as unconstitutional because it exceeded the commerce clause powers);
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990) (invalidating the Flag Protection Act of
1989 as an unconstitutional abridgement of the First Amendment right to free speech);
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (invalidating the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to the president, and for exceeding Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce).
5. For academic literature focusing on Congress's response to the Court's apparent
misinterpretations of congressional statements, see generally James J. Brudney, Congres-
sional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Re-
sponse?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1994); Eskridge, supra note 3; William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 613 (1991); Roger Handberg & Harold F. Hill, Jr., Court Curbing, Court Reversals,
and Judicial Review: The Supreme Court Versus Congress, 14 L. & Soc'y REV. 309 (1980);
Beth Henschen, Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressional Response, 11
AM. POL. Q. 441 (1983); Beth M. Henschen & Edward I. Sidlow, The Supreme Court and
the Congressional Agenda-Setting Process, 5 J.L. & POL. 685 (1989); Abner J. Mikva & Jeff
Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV. 729 (1991); Michael E,
Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court
Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425 (1992); Harry P. Stumpf, Congressional Re-
sponse to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J. PuB. L. 377
(1965); Note, Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-1957, 71 HARV. L,
REV. 1324 (1958).
6. Generally, the Court interprets either constitutional or statutory law. See gener-
ally CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1982) (providing a thor-
ough analysis of the canons of constitutional construction); C. Edward Fletcher III,
Principlist Models in the Analysis of Constitutional and Statutory Texts, 72 IOWA L. REV.
891 (1987) (arguing that textual analysts should abandon conical and cylindrical principlist
models in favor of a reflexive model to interpret statutory and constitutional texts);
Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation,
77 VA. L. REv. 669, 719 (1991) (concluding that questions of constitutional theory should
no longer concern conceptions of constitutional interpretation, but should focus on politics
and the judicial role in our system of government); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and
Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921 (1992) (arguing that the canons
of statutory interpretation ordinarily are employed as necessary to achieve statutory objec-
tives, but that overreliance on the canons may frustrate the statute's legislative purpose).
Frequently at issue when interpreting or construing statutory law is whether the Court
should interpret statutes narrowly according to the presumptive definitions and the plain
language of the text, or broadly according to the presumed legislative intent. See Shapiro,
supra, at 931-34, 941-50 (discussing the plain meaning and legislative purpose approaches
utilized by the Court in its statutory interpretations). Although the terms "interpretation"
and "construction" often are used interchangeably, the strict usage of the terms require
distinction. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 818 (6th ed. 1990) (distinguishing "interpreta-
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type of disagreement recently led Congress to pass legislation amending
18 U.S.C. § 1001, commonly referred to as the "False Statements
Statute. ,
7
tion" from "construction"). Interpretation involves the "ascertainment of the meaning of
the maker of the written document," while "construction" may go further and explain the
legal consequences and effects of the ascertained intention of the document in question or it
may provide courts with guidance "in the absence of express or implied intention." In re
Union Trust Co., 151 N.Y.S. 246,249-50 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.) (emphasis added), modified by 156
N.Y.S. 32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1915), modified by 114 N.E. 1048 (N.Y. 1916).
Moreover, once the Court selects the method of interpreting a statute, it must then con-
sider the implications of stare decisis if its method will result in a different result than a
previous Court's interpretation of the same statute. Stare decisis is defined as a
[d]octrine that, when [a] court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable
to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future
cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties
and property are the same.
or
[a] doctrine, [such that] when [a] point of law has been settled by decision, it
forms precedent which is not afterwards to be departed from, and, while it should
ordinarily be strictly adhered to, there are occasions when departure is rendered
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued in-
justice. The doctrine is not ordinarily departed from where [a] decision is of long-
standing and rights have been acquired under it, unless considerations of public
policy demand it.
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, supra, at 1406 (citing Horne v. Moody, 146 S.W.2d 505, 509-10
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940) (first quotation); Colonial Trust Co. v. Flanagan, 25 A.2d 728, 729
(Pa. 1942) (second quotation)).
The Supreme Court is extremely reluctant to disturb its prior statutory interpretations.
See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989). The Patterson Court
stated:
[T]he burden borne by the party advocating the abandonment of an established
precedent is greater where the Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory
construction. Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of stat-
utory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpreta-
tion, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what
we have done.
Id. The only realistic method of overturning prior constitutional rulings, however, is for
the Court to overrule itself. See id. Conversely, if Congress determines that the Court
misconstrued a statute, the legislature has the power to remedy the misconstruction by
amending the law in order to make congressional intent explicit. See id. The Court, there-
fore, need not alter its previous statutory rulings when it is within congressional power to
do so. See id. Precedent, however, does not always preclude reevaluative interpretation of
statutory provisions.
7. The 104th Congress passed legislation amending 18 U.S.C. § 1001, to overrule ex-
plicitly the Supreme Court's decision in Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995).
See H.R. Res. 535, 104th Cong., 142 CONG. REc. H11,246 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1996) (en-
acted) (agreeing to suspend the rules and to pass House Resolution 535, which provided
for the concurrence of the House, with an amendment, in the amendments of the Senate to
the bill H.R. 3166 by a recorded vote of 424 yeas); 142 CONG. REc. S11,605, S11,608-609
(daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (reporting the Senate's concurrence to the amendment by voice
vote, clearing the measure for the president); see also infra notes 219-54 and accompanying
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Prior to the 1996 Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 proscribed making
false statements to any "agency" or "department" of the United States in
any matter within the agency or department's jurisdiction.8 Specifically,
§ 1001 criminalized the act of willfully and knowingly falsifying or con-
cealing any material fact, or making any false or fraudulent statement, or
knowingly making or using any false writing or document in any matter
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.
9
In 1955, the Supreme Court determined, in United States v. Bram-
blett,10 that the term "department" as used in § 1001 applied to all three
branches of the government." Thus, for forty years it was understood
that § 1001 applied to false statements made during judicial proceed-
ings.' 2 This broad interpretation of the term "department" and the pen-
alties13 available under § 1001 provided federal authorities a formidable
text (discussing Congress's amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to overrule Hubbard and to
address the Court's "judicial function" concerns).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). The pre-1996 statute read:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. Id.
9. See id.
10. 348 U.S. 503 (1955), overruled by Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995).
11. See id. at 509. The Bramblett Court concluded that "[t]he development, scope and
purpose of the section shows that 'department,' as used in this context, was meant to de-
scribe the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Government." Id. While it is
generally understood that this particular definitional language is dictum, it nevertheless
was read as requiring application of § 1001 to all three branches of government. See
United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760, 764 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that Bramblett's con-
clusion that "department" includes the judicial branch was dictum); Brief for the United
States at 9, Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995) (No. 94-172) (conceding that
the Bramblett language "in a formal sense" was merely dictum, but arguing that the under-
lying rationale of the Court's holding does not allow distinction among the branches of
government).
12. See Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 509; see also United States v. Plascencia-Orozco, 768
F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a criminal defendant who gives a false name
to a magistrate trying the defendant's case is in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001); United
States v. Abrahams, 604 F.2d 386, 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding that the § 1001
phrase, "matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency," includes the judici-
ary; however, the statute does not apply to a defendant making false statements during a
bail hearing), overruled in part by United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1041,
1043 (5th Cir. 1994); Stein v. United States, 363 F.2d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that
the Tax Court is an "agency" within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1001); United States v.
Abrahams, 453 F. Supp. 749, 750 (D. Mass. 1978) (concluding that a defendant accused of
giving a false name and other false information to a United States Magistrate during a bail
hearing may be charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
13. Section 1001 provides for relatively stiff penalties. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). If
convicted, a defendant could be imprisoned up to five years, fined, or both. See id.
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weapon with which to prosecute persons who knowingly and willfully
made false statements to any of the three branches of government.' 4
In Hubbard v. United States,'5 the Supreme Court reconsidered the
Bramblett Court's interpretation of § 1001.16 Specifically at issue in Hub-
bard was whether § 1001 applied to judicial proceedings. 17 The Hubbard
Court faced the following options: (1) adhere to the doctrine of stare de-
cisis by allowing Bramblett's broad statutory interpretation to stand; (2)
apply presumptive definitions to the words "agency" and "department"
as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 6,18 thereby
overruling Bramblett; or (3) allow federal circuits to continue using the
judicial function exception to Bramblett's broad interpretation, thus
avoiding the problem of overturning long-standing precedent. 19
The petitioner in Hubbard filed two unsworn written documents during
bankruptcy proceedings with the Bankruptcy Court; one responded to an
amended complaint and the other to a motion to compel surrender of
relevant business records."0 Both responses contained false state-
14. See United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1978) (concluding that
§ 1001 serves as a "catch-all, reaching those false representations that might 'substantially
impair the basic functions entrusted by law to [the particular] agency,' but which are not
prohibited by other statutes") (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1001) (alteration in original); United
States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771, 780 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that a defendant is not denied
due process when prosecuted under § 1001 for a felony, rather than under an overlapping
misdemeanor statute, as the prosecutor has the discretion to determine what statute to
employ).
15. 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995).
16. See id. at 1758.
17. See id. at 1756.
18. Section 6 of title 18 defines "department" as "one of the executive departments
enumerated in section 1 of Title 5, unless the context shows that such term was intended to
describe the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the government." 18 U.S.C. § 6.
Section 6 defines "agency" as "any department, independent establishment, commission,
administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in
which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term
was intended to be used in a more limited sense." Id.
19. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1761-65.
20. See id. at 1756. In 1985, the petitioner filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code. See id. The trustee, believing that the petitioner had provided false
information, filed a complaint seeking to prevent the petitioner from discharging his debt.
See Brief for the United States at 3, Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995) (No.
94-172). A successor trustee filed an amended complaint and a motion to compel the peti-
tioner to surrender relevant business records. See id. The amended complaint alleged that
the petitioner was storing a well-drilling machine at his residence and various parts of the
machine in a warehouse. See id. The petitioner's written response to the Bankruptcy
Court denied the allegations. See id. In written response to the trustee's motion to compel
surrender of the petitioner's business books and records, the petitioner denied withholding
the requested documentation by asserting that he had submitted the requested documents
to the previous trustee. See id. Both of the petitioner's written responses were found to
contain falsehoods by the trier of fact. See id. at 4.
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ments.2' The petitioner was indicted and charged with bankruptcy
fraud,22 mail fraud,23 and three counts under § 1001 for making false
statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy
court.24 The petitioner was found guilty on all counts.25
The petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, contending that his false statements to the bankruptcy court
were beyond the scope of § 1001.26 Specifically, the petitioner argued
that the false statements were made while the court was exercising its
"judicial functions," or alternatively, that the plain language of the statute
did not encompass his activity.27 The court of appeals rejected the judi-
21. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1756.
22. See United States v. Hubbard, 16 F.3d 694, 696 (6th Cir. 1994) (charging petitioner
with four counts of bankruptcy fraud), rev'd in part, Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct.
1754 (1995); see also 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1994) (criminalizing the concealment of assets from
"creditors or the United States Trustee, any property belonging to the estate of a debtor").
23. See Hubbard, 16 F.3d at 696 (charging petitioner with three counts of mail fraud);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (criminalizing the use of any public or private postal service for
fraudulent purposes).
24. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1756-57; Respondent's Brief at 3, Hubbard (No. 94-
172); see also supra note 20 (providing the factual context within which the false statements
were made to the Bankruptcy Court).
25. See Brief for Petitioner at 4, Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995) (No.
94-172).
26. See Hubbard, 16 F.3d at 696-97.
27. See id. Hubbard's most powerful argument rested upon a judicially-created excep-
tion to § 1001 liability known as the "judicial function" exception. See id. at 698-700. The
"adjudicative/judicial function" exception was created to allow unsworn false statements to
be made without fear of prosecution, while the courts' perform their "adjudicative" func-
tions. See infra text accompanying notes 99-134 (providing an analysis of the judicial func-
tion exception). The exception, however, does not create an exemption from prosecution
for false statements made to the courts while they are performing their administrative func-
tions. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1757. Some courts, however, reached different conclu-
sions in distinguishing between "administrative" and "adjudicative." Compare United
States v. Holmes, 840 F.2d 246, 248-49 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding that false statements
made to a magistrate judge during a plea hearing were subject to § 1001 prosecution be-
cause they were made while the court performed its "administrative" functions), with
United States v. Abrahams, 604 F.2d 386, 393 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding that false state-
ments made to a magistrate at a bail hearing were made while the court was performing an
adjudicative function, and therefore were not subject to prosecution under § 1001), over-
ruled in part by United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 1994). Still other
courts applied the exception without clearly distinguishing between administrative or adju-
dicative functions. See United States v. Deffenbaugh Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 749, 751-54
(10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the exception applies to false affidavits submitted to the
United States Department of Justice in connection with grand jury investigations).
The exception purposely protects "traditional trial tactics" from § 1001's "conceals or
covers up" provision. See United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760, 766 (2d Cir. 1991)
(adopting the judicial function exception, and finding the submission of a false letter of
recommendation during a sentencing hearing clearly adjudicative and not subject to § 1001
liability). The phrase "conceals or covers up" is ambiguous enough to cause concern
among some that defense attorneys may be targeted for prosecution because of "vigorous
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cial function exception. 28 Further, the court concluded that Bramblett
controlled on the issue of the statute's scope, and it affirmed the peti-
tioner's § 1001 convictions.29
The Supreme Court granted certiorari3 ° to resolve a split in the cir-
cuits3' on the issue of the judicial function exception and to determine the
applicability of § 1001 to judicial proceedings. 32 In a six to three deci-
sion,3 3 the Supreme Court reversed the petitioner's convictions brought
representation" of their clients' interests. Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1765 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment) (reasoning that if § 1001 is applied to judicial
proceedings it "will deter vigorous representation of opposing interests in adversarial
litigation").
The petitioner's other contentions, which were not at issue in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion, were that his false statements were "trivial falsehoods and thus not material as re-
quired by § 1001," and that his statements fell "within the 'exculpatory "no"' exception to
liability under § 1001." Hubbard, 16 F.3d at 697 (footnote omitted). The circuit court in
Hubbard found that the false statements were material under the standard applied in
United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1319 (6th Cir. 1991) (en banc) because the statements
had "the capability of influencing the bankruptcy court's function in determining what as-
sets the debtor had and where those assets were so that they could be made available for
the repayment of creditors." Hubbard, 16 F.3d at 698. Further, the court rejected the
petitioner's "exculpatory 'no' argument as a rejected doctrine in the Sixth Circuit. See id.
(citing Steele, 933 F.2d at 1319-22).
28. See Hubbard, 16 F.3d at 701.
29. See id. at 701-03.
30. Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994).
31. The Sixth Circuit was the only one to reject the exception outright, although both
the Seventh Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit questioned the basis of the excep-
tion. Compare United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (questioning
the rationale of the exception and denying extension of any such exception to false state-
ments made during legislative inquiries), and United States v. Barber, 881 F.2d 345, 349-50
(7th Cir. 1989) (questioning the basis for the judicial function exception, and holding that
an attorney's transmittal of false letters to the court regarding sentencing of client did not
fall within the exception, if one existed, because the false statements were not made during
the attorney's own proceeding), with United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 694-95 (10th Cir.
1993) (adopting the exception and holding that false statements made to FBI agents acting
under auspices of a federal grand jury were not subject to § 1001 liability), Masterpol, 940
F.2d at 766 (adopting the judicial function exception, and finding the submission of a false
letter of recommendation during a sentencing hearing is clearly adjudicative and not sub-
ject to § 1001 liability); Holmes, 840 F.2d at 248 (adopting the judicial function exception,
but finding a false signature on a form where the defendant consented to appear before
magistrate was made during execution of magistrate's administrative functions, and there-
fore subject to § 1001 liability); United States v. Mayer, 775 F.2d 1387, 1390-92 (9th Cir.
1985) (per curiam) (adopting the exception and finding the submission of false letters of
recommendation to the sentencing judge within the court's adjudicative functions), and
Abrahams, 604 F.2d at 393 (adopting the exception, and finding a defendant's false state-
ments providing a false name and denying aliases and previous arrests before a magistrate
judge during removal proceedings within the court's adjudicative functions).
32. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1757.
33. See id. at 1756. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and deliv-
ered its opinion. See id. He was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg,
and Breyer with respect to Parts I, II, III, and VI, and by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
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under § 1001.34 Moreover, the Court found Bramblett's broad interpreta-
tion and expansive construction of § 1001 to be erroneous.
35
The majority found it unnecessary to determine the validity of the judi-
cial function exception because it applied the presumptive definitions of
"agency" and "department" in construing the statute.37 Section 6 of
title 18 defines "department" as "one of the executive departments...
unless the context shows that such term was intended to describe [an-
other] branch[ ] of the government,, 38 and "agency" as "any department,
independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board
or bureau of the United States ... unless the context shows that such
term was intended to be used in a more limited sense."39 These statutory
definitions provided the Court with the foundation on which it based its
holding. 0
Justice Stevens's plurality opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer, examined the basis for departing from stare decisis in statutory
interpretation cases.41 Justice Stevens reasoned that the judicial function
exception was an intervening development of the law that justified over-
ruling Bramblett.42 The majority concluded that the judiciary did not fall
within the meaning of "agency" or "department" as used in § 1001; thus,
false statements made during judicial proceedings were not subject to
§ 1001 liability.43
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy,
agreed with the outcome, but reasoned that Bramblett should be over-
ruled not because of an intervening development of law, but because
Bramblett's erroneous reading of the law created an unacceptable risk."
Justice Scalia explained that Bramblett created an increased potential for
criminal prosecution under its expansive interpretation of § 1001.4" Ac-
cordingly, that potential for criminal prosecution would have a chilling
with respect to parts IV and V. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in judgment, in which Justice Kennedy joined. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices O'Connor and Souter joined. See id.
34. See id. at 1765.
35. See id.
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 6 (1994) (providing statutory definitions of "agency" and
"department").
37. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1757-58.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 6.
39. Id.
40. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1757-61.
41. See id. at 1761-65.
42. See id. at 1764.
43. See id. at 1758.
44. See id. at 1765 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
45. See id.
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effect on lawyers, particularly those representing criminal defendants,
which might lead to less than vigorous advocacy of their clients'
interests.
46
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, dis-
sented, arguing that the principle of stare decisis should control.47 The
Chief Justice asserted that if Bramblett's construction of § 1001 is errone-
ous, it is within the province and power of Congress to redress the prob-
lem.48 Therefore, the Court erred in overruling Bramblett.49
This Note examines the potential ramifications that Hubbard would
have had on judicial proceedings and legislative affairs absent congres-
sional response to the ruling. First, this Note reviews the historical devel-
opment of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, culminating with the 1955 Bramblett
decision. Next, this Note presents an overview of the reasoning and pur-
poses behind the "judicial function" exception. This Note then analyzes
the Supreme Court's majority, plurality, concurring, and dissenting opin-
ions in Hubbard, and examines the considerations the Hubbard Court
faced in evaluating the principle of stare decisis. This Note then examines
the impact the decision would have had on judicial proceedings and the
immediate impact it did have in the legislative realm, as well as the con-
gressional response to the Court's interpretation of § 1001. This Note
concludes that the Court's application of the presumptive definitions to
the statute's terms was the correct approach to statutory interpretation
and that the ruling sent to Congress a clear message that congressional
intent must be explicit in the text of the statute.
I. PROGENITORS AND HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF § 1001
A. The False Claims Acts
Congress passed the first false claims act in response to the chaos cre-
ated by the Civil War, which provided unscrupulous individuals with the
opportunity to defraud the United States Government by presenting in-
flated claims or claims for services or products that were never actually
provided.50 Congress addressed this problem by passing the false claims
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1766 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also supra note 6 (providing the
reasoning behind the Court's reluctance to overturn prior statutory interpretations).
48. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1769; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989) (discussing the rationale underlying the Court's reluctance to over-
rule its prior statutory interpretations).
49. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1769.
50. See United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 504 (1955) ("Section 1001 had its
origin in a statute passed almost 100 years ago [during the Civil War] in the wake of a spate
Catholic University Law Review
statute in March of 1863 (1863 Act).5' The 1863 Act categorized the
presentation of a false claim for payment to the federal government as a
criminal offense.52 In addition, the 1863 Act proscribed false statements
made in an attempt to facilitate a payment for a false claim.53
The false statement prohibition of the 1863 Act was more narrow in
scope than pre-1996 amendment § 1001.54 The 1863 Act proscribed only
false statements made "for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding in ob-
taining, the approval or payment of a false claim."' 55 Prior to the 1996
amendment, § 1001 proscribed anyone from willfully or knowingly mak-
ing false statements "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any depart-
ment or agency of the United States."'56 Thus, the purpose of the 1863
Act was to prevent financial fraud against the federal government, while
pre-1996 amendment § 1001's purpose was to prevent false statements
made in connection with any matter within the jurisdiction of any
"agency" or "department" of the government.57
of frauds upon the Government."), overruled by Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754
(1995).
51. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 287
(1994)) ("An Act to prevent and punish Frauds upon the Government of the United
States.").
52. See id. at 696-97. The language of the 1863 Act made it a criminal offense for any
person, whether a civilian or a member of the military services, to make false claims for
payment upon the federal government. See id. at 696. Specifically, the statute made it
unlawful for any person
to present or cause to be presented for payment or approval to or by any person
or officer in the civil or military service of the United States, any claim upon or
against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer
thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent ....
Id.
53. See id. at 696-97. The clause, found in the same section of the false claims section,
proscribed false statements as follows:
[A]ny person in such forces or service who shall, for the purpose of obtaining, or
aiding in obtaining, the approval or payment of such claim, make, use, or cause to
be made or used, any false bill, receipt, voucher, entry, roll, account, claim, state-
ment, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain any false
or fraudulent statement or entry ....
Id. (emphasis added).
54. See Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (1995). This statement applies
as well to the newly amended § 1001 because the amended § 1001 prohibits the same con-
duct as the pre-1996 amendment statute and explicitly broadens the scope to encompass all
three branches of government. See infra note 235 (providing text of the newly amended
§ 1001).
55. Chapter 67, 12 Stat. at 696.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
57. See United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 92-94 (1941) (concluding that § 1001
also applies to false statements not involving pecuniary fraud, whereas the Court's prior
construction of the 1863 Act (amended by Act of Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015), in
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The scope of the 1863 Act was expanded incrementally over the years,
but remained essentially unchanged until 1918.58 In that year, Congress
amended the 1863 Act with legislation (1918 Act) that criminalized false
claims made against not only the federal government and its departments,
but also against any corporation in which the United States was a stock-
holder.59 While the 1918 Act brought government corporations under
the umbrella of the statute, the focus of the Act remained not on false
statements per se, but on false statements or claims intended to further
financial frauds against the federal government.
60
The Act of June 18, 1934 (1934 Act) revised the 1918 Act to include
language essentially the same as that of pre-1996 amendment § 1001.61
United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1926), had concluded that the fraudulent state-
ments must relate to pecuniary or property loss).
58. The 1863 Act was codified in 1873 and the scope was extended to cover "every
person"-not just those in the "land or naval forces of the United States." See 18 Stat.
1054, § 5438 (representing a codification and revision of the 1863 Act). The Court in Hub-
bard points out, however, that the Bramblett Court had "incorrectly stated that the 1863
Act only penalized misconduct by members of the military. In fact, § 3 of the Act estab-
lished criminal and civil penalties for false claims and other misdeeds committed by 'any
person not in the military or naval forces of the United States."' Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at
1760 n.7 (quoting ch. 67, 12 Stat. at 698) (emphasis added).
The penalties were changed in 1908, Act of May 30, 1908, ch. 235, 35 Stat. 555, and
§ 5438 of the Criminal Code was changed to § 35 in a 1909 recodification, Act of Mar. 4,
1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1095. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1760 n.8; United States v. Brain-
blett, 348 U.S. 503, 506 n.2 (1955).
59. See Act of Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015. The amended statute provided as
follows:
[W]hoever, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or ap-
proval of [a false] claim, or for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and
swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States, or any department
thereof, or any corporation in which the United States of America is a stock-
holder, shall knowingly and willfully falsify or conceal or cover up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact ... or make or use or cause to be made or used
any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposi-
tion, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry
... [shall be punished].
Id. at 1015-16.
60. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1760 (stating that the scope of the "statute remained
relatively narrow: it was limited to false statements intended to bilk the government out of
money or property") (citing United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339 (1926) (declaring the false
claims provision applicable only in cases causing monetary or property loss to the
government)).
61. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996 (amending then § 35 of the Criminal
Code). In pertinent part, the Act stated:
[W]hoever shall knowingly and willfully falsify or conceal or cover up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or make or cause to be made any false or
fraudulent statements or representations, or make or use or cause to be made or
used any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or
deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or
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The Act of June 25, 1948, revised and bifurcated the 1934 Act into a
"false claims" provision and a "false statements" provision.62 The false
statements provision remained essentially unchanged from the 1934 Act
until the 1996 amendment.63
The pre-1996 amendment language of § 1001 swept broadly, and in-
cluded all material willfully and knowingly false or fraudulent statements
entry, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States or of any corporation in which the United States of America is a
stockholder ... [shall be punished].
Id. at 996-97 (emphasis added). The 1934 revision was enacted primarily at the urging of
the Secretary of the Interior in order to reach not only false papers presented in connec-
tion with a claim against the government, but also nonmonetary frauds, such as those in-
volved in the "hot-oil" shipments. See Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 93-94 (holding that the
relevant part of § 35 of the U.S. Criminal Code, as amended by the Act of June 18, 1934, is
not restricted to cases involving pecuniary or property loss to the United States).
In Gilliland, the Court examined the legislative history of the 1934 Act. See id. The
Secretary of the Interior sought the amendment to aid the Department of Interior with
enforcement of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (1933 Act) relating to the
transportation of "hot oil." See id. at 94. Because the 1933 Act did not proscribe the
"presentation of false papers" in connection with the reporting requirements of the Act,
the Secretary was concerned with circumvention of the Act. See Letter from Harold Ickes,
Secretary of the Interior, to Henry F. Anhurst, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, in 78 CONG. REC. 2859 (1934) (expressing the Secretary's concern about loopholes
available under the 1933 Act), and in S. REP. No. 73-288, at 1 (1934), and in H.R. REP. No.
73-829, at 2 (1934). The initial bill, which Congress passed at the behest of the Secretary of
the Interior, required an "intent to defraud the United States." See 78 CONG. REC. 3724
(1934) (providing text of original bill). President Roosevelt returned the initial bill without
approval, explaining that existing law already covered the offenses as the proposed law
defined and, moreover, provided more severe penalties than those proposed. See 78
CONG. REC. 6778 (1934) (discussing the President's refusal to sign the proposed bill). The
Secretary proposed a new measure satisfying the President's concern while still accom-
plishing the objective of reaching the submission of false papers in relation to "hot oil"
shipments. See Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 94 (providing legislative history of 1934 Act). When
signed into law, the 1934 Act, as revised by the Secretary, omitted the language underlying
the Court's holding in United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339 (1926), that the 1918 Act
reached only those frauds causing pecuniary or property loss to the United States Govern-
ment. See Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996; see also 78 CONG. REC. 11,271 (1934)
(providing the text of the enacted bill). The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee
stated the purpose of the amendment as, "reaching a large number of cases involving the
shipment of 'hot' oil, where false papers are presented in connection therewith." S. REP.
No. 73-1202, at 1 (1934).
62. The former version of 18 U.S.C. § 80 (1940) was bifurcated into 18 U.S.C. § 287
(false claims) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements). See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645,
§ 1, 62 Stat. 683.
63. See United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 508 (1955), overruled by Hubbard v.
United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995). The false claims provision also remained essentially
unchanged from the 1934 Act. Compare Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996
(amending then § 35 of the Criminal Code), with 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994) (current false
claims statute).
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proffered to any federal government "agency" or "department., 64 This
broad sweep made it all the more important that the Supreme Court pru-
dently define the terms "agency" or "department" in construing the stat-
ute's scope.65
B. United States v. Bramblett: Construing 18 U.S. C. § 1001 to Fit the
Court's Conception of "Congressional Intent"
United States v. Bramblett66 was the seminal case construing the scope
of § 1001 for forty years.67 Bramblett, a former United States Congress-
man charged with violating § 1001,68 was found guilty of making false and
fraudulent representations to the Disbursing Office of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 69 After conviction, Bramblett presented a motion in arrest
of judgment,7" claiming that the indictment failed to state an offense
against the United States because the indictment failed to charge him
with falsifying any fact "within the jurisdiction of a [federal] department
or agency."71 Bramblett asserted that the House of Representatives Dis-
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001; supra note 8 (providing the pre-1996 amendment text of 18
U.S.C. § 1001).
65. See Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 508-10 (concluding that the terms "agency" and "de-
partment" were intended to apply to all three branches of the federal government).
66. 348 U.S. 503 (1955), overruled by Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995).
67. See United States v. Hubbard, 16 F.3d 694, 699 (6th Cir. 1994) (following Brain-
blett's instruction that the terms "any department or agency" as used in § 1001 apply to the
legislative and judicial branches), rev'd in part, Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754
(1995).
68. See United States v. Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. 857, 858 (D.D.C. 1954), rev'd, 348
U.S. 503 (1955), overruled by Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995).
69. See Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 504. Bramblett was charged with eighteen counts of
violating 18.U.S.C. § 1001. See id. at 503-04. At trial, a judgment of acquittal was ordered
on eleven counts and the jury returned a guilty verdict on the remaining seven counts. See
id. at 504. These seven counts charged Bramblett with falsely representing that a certain
woman was entitled to compensation as his official clerk. See id.
70. See Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. at 858. A motion in arrest of judgment allows a judge
to either stay or refuse to enter a judgment if, in the court's determination, the indictment
or information is insufficient in some manner. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 34. Specifically, Rule
34 provides:
The court on motion of a defendant shall arrest judgment if the indictment or
information does not charge an offense or if the court was without jurisdiction of
the offense charged. The motion in arrest of judgment shall be made within 7
days after verdict or finding of guilty, or after plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or
within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period.
Id.
In the alternative, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 29, or for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.
Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. at 857-58. Bramblett's motions for judgment of aquittal and for a
new trial were denied. See id.
71. Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. at 858.
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bursing Office did not fall within the meaning of "any agency or depart-
ment of the United States," and therefore he could not be charged under
§ 1001 for making a false statement to this office.72
After analyzing the legislative history of § 1001,71 the definitions of
"agency" and "department" provided in 18 U.S.C. § 6, and other rele-
vant sections of the Code 71 the United States District Court for the Dis-
72. lId
73. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (providing discussion of the legislative
history of the Act).
74. See supra note 18 (providing statutory definitions of "agency" and "department").
75. See Act of Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, § 4, 63 Stat. 579 (formerly 5 U.S.C. § 1, codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)) (providing a list of all executive departments); see
also Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. at 862-65 (referring to other acts' interpretations of "depart-
ment" or "agency"). Because the definition of "department" in 18 U.S.C. § 6 specifically
states that it refers to one of the executive departments listed in § 1 of title 5 (currently 18
U.S.C. § 101), unless the context shows that the term was intended to describe another
branch, the court reviewed numerous sections in title 18 where the context clearly shows
that the term "department or agency" was intended to describe a branch other than the
executive. See id. at 862-63. For example, the court reviewed § 201, which provides:
Whoever promises, offers, or gives any money or thing of value ... for the pay-
ment of money or for the delivery or conveyance of anything of value, to any
officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any
department or agency thereof, in any official function, under or by authority of
any such department or agency or to any officer or person acting for or on behalf
of either House of Congress, or of any committee of either House, or both Houses
thereof ....
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 201, 62 Stat. 691 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 201
(1994)) (emphasis added).
The court also reviewed § 283, since repealed and supplanted in 18 U.S.C. § 205, which
then stated: "Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or any depart-
ment or agency thereof, or of the Senate or House of Representatives, acts as an agent or
attorney for prosecuting any claim against the United States .. " Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
645, § 283, 62 Stat. 697 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1994)) (emphasis added).
Additionally, the court reviewed § 602, which then stated:
Whoever, being a Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commis-
sioner to, or a candidate for Congress, or individual elected as, Senator, Repre-
sentative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, or an officer or employee of the
United States or any department or agency thereof, or a person receiving any sal-
ary or compensation for services from money derived from the Treasury of the
United States ....
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 602, 62 Stat. 722 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 602
(1994)) (emphasis added).
Finally, the court reviewed § 1505, which at the time provided:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or commu-
nication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any pro-
ceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in
connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or in any
committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress ....
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1505, 62 Stat. 770 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1505
(1994)) (emphasis added).
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trict of Columbia concluded that Congress did not intend the legislative
branch to fall within the meaning of "agency" or "department" for § 1001
purposes.76 Accordingly, the court granted the motion in arrest of judg-
ment.7 7 The court determined that the language in § 1001, which was
changed by the 1934 Act, was not "all-inclusive," whereas § 287 (false
claims provision), whose language remained essentially unchanged in the
1934 Act from its previous rendering in the 1918 Act, was intended to be
"all-inclusive" language.78 The court reasoned that the change in lan-
guage to the false statements provision limiting the scope of jurisdiction
to any department or agency of the United States, together with the § 6
definitions of "agency" and "department, 7 9 and the reviser's notes, ° was
conclusive evidence of congressional intent to restrict the scope of § 1001
to the executive branch.81
Because these statutes specifically provided context showing congressional intent to go
beyond "any agency or department of the United States," the court concluded that if Con-
gress had wanted § 1001 to include the legislature, it would have explicitly stated, just as it
had in the foregoing statutes. See Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. at 865.
The court further examined the government's argument that 18 U.S.C. § 1017, which
criminalized fraudulently affixing official seals, should not be limited solely to the execu-
tive branch. See id. at 863. The government contended that to hold otherwise would allow
legislative and judicial seals to be "used with impunity," while criminalizing the same act
using the executive seal. See id. The court, however, found this argument to work in favor
of the defendant. See id. at 863-64. Section 505 of Title 18, which relates to seals of the
courts, provided punishment for forging or counterfeiting the seal of a court. See Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 505, 62 Stat. 714 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 505 (1994)).
Section 506 allowed punishment for one fraudulently affixing the seal of any "departments
or agencies" of the federal government. See § 506, 62 Stat. at 714. The court concluded
that if Congress had intended the terms "department or agency" in § 506 to be inclusive of
the judicial branch, then § 505 would be superfluous, because it provides precisely the
same penalties as § 506. See Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. at 863-64.
76. See Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. at 865.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 861. The court noted that the language of the false statements provision
had been changed from "false statements or representations made 'for the purpose and
with the intent of cheating and swindling or defrauding the Government of the United
States, or any department thereof,"' to "'in any matter within the jurisdiction of any de-
partment or agency of the United States."' Id. at 860.
79. See supra note 18 (providing statutory definitions of "agency" and "department").
80. See Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. at 862. The court deemed the reviser's notes to 18
U.S.C. § 6 to be significant. See id. In pertinent part, the notes read:
This section defines the terms "department" and "agency" of the United States.
The word "department" appears 57 times in Title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., and the
word "agency" 14 times. It was considered necessary to define clearly these
words in order to avoid possible litigation as to the scope or coverage of a given
section containing such words.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 6 (1969) (Reviser's Note)); see also United States v. Germaine,
99 U.S. 508, 510-11 (defining "department" and "heads of department").
81. See Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. at 861-64.
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The government appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United
States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731.82 The Supreme Court reversed the
district court,83 noting that the 1863 Act did not specify any particular
group to whom the false statements must be made.84 The Court main-
tained that the "false claims" provision of the 1863 Act, which criminal-
ized the "presentation of false claims to 'any person or officer in the civil
or military service of the United States,"' could reasonably apply to the
"false statements" provision.
85
After analyzing the 1934 revisions to the Act, the Court determined
that the insertion of the phrase "in any matter within the jurisdiction of
any department or agency of the United States" did not render the stat-
ute inapplicable to the legislative or judicial branches.86 The Court con-
cluded that the purpose of the phrase was to broaden the statute to
include not only false statements furthering a pecuniary fraud, but also
false statements involving non-monetary frauds.87
82. See United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 504 (1955), overruled by Hubbard v.
United States, 115 S. Ct 1754 (1995). The appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court
because, prior to 1971, the United States could appeal from a district court directly to the
Supreme Court. See The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act Amendments, Pub.
L. No. 91-644, tit III, § 14(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1890 (1971) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1994)). The appeal was allowed
from decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indictment or informa-
tion, or any count thereof and from decisions arresting judgment of conviction for
insufficiency of indictment or information, where such decision or judgment was
based upon invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or
information was founded.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3731 (1985) (Reviser's Note). Section 3731 currently reads in pertinent part:
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or
order, entered by a district court of the United States, granting the release of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense, or denying a motion for revoca-
tion of, or modification of the conditions of, a decision or order granting release.
The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
purposes.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3731.
83. See Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 510.
84. See id. at 505.
85. See id. (quoting Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696). The Court reasoned that
there would be no justification in limiting the scope of the false statements provision more
narrowly than the false claims provision. See id.
86. See id. at 506.
87. See id. at 507. The Court's conclusion seems supportable given the fact that the
1934 Act was aimed at preventing false reporting in relation to "hot-oil" shipments, not
pecuniary frauds per se. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (providing legislative
history surrounding the 1934 Act). The Court, however, seems to have given insufficient
consideration to the 1948 revision which changed the statute to its present form. See infra
note 90 and accompanying text (arguing that congressional intent may have been to limit
the scope of the false statements provision of the 1934 Act).
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The Court found that the legislative history failed to indicate Con-
gress's intent to restrict the scope of the statute, and that there was no
indication that the new phrase applied solely to the executive branch.88
The Court concluded that the new phrase compensated for the deleted
language in the statute by clarifying that only false statements made to
government entities were prohibited by the Act.89 Moreover, the Court
insisted that the 1948 revision did not substantively change the 1934
Act.90 It found that the false statements section of the Act retained a
"scope at least as broad as the false claims section" and, accordingly, the
statute extended to false statements made to any branch of the federal
government, not merely the executive branch. 91
The Court also considered the § 6 definitions of "department" and
"agency," and declared that the context in which these terms are used
required an "unrestricted interpretation." 92 The Court concluded that
Congress must have intended to prohibit frauds directed to the legislative
or judicial branches.93 The Court contended that congressional intent
would be thwarted by limiting the statute's scope to only falsifications
made to executive departments.94 The Court noted, in dictum, that the
context in which the term "department" was used in the provision indi-
cated that Congress intended the Act's scope to encompass "the execu-
tive, legislative and judicial branches of the Government." 95
The Court emphasized the legislative history of the Act and deter-
mined that the difference in language between §§ 287 and 1001 was im-
material in its construction.96 Finally, while the Court acknowledged the
88. See Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 507 (citing S. REP. No. 73-1202 (1934); H.R. REP. No.
73-1463 (1934); 78 CONG. REc. 8136, 11,270, 11,513 (1934)).
89. See id. at 507-08; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting the change
in the language of the false statements provision in the 1934 Act).
90. See Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 508. It could be argued, however, that by separating the
"false statement" provision from the "false claims" provision, Congress could have in-
tended to limit the scope of § 1001 to "agency" or "department" as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 6. See United States v. Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. 857, 861 (D.D.C. 1954), rev'd, 348 U.S.
503 (1955), overruled by Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995).
91. Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 508.
92. See id. at 509.
93. See id The Court, however, seems to have ignored the possibility that Bramblett's
conduct may have been punished under § 287, the false claims statute, because Bramblett
had presented a false claim to the Disbursement Office of the House of Representatives;
conduct, according to the reasoning in United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339, 345-346 (1926),
which should have fallen within the scope of § 287. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1759 n.5.
94. See Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 509.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. See id.; supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text (describing legislative history
surrounding the 1934 Act and the revisions made to the false statements provision of the
statute).
Catholic University Law Review
propriety of strict constructionism, it nevertheless concluded that its ren-
dering of the legislative purpose was correct, despite the plain language
and presumptive definitions contained in the Act.97
1. Judicial Reluctance: Creation of the "Judicial Function" Exception
as a Means of Escaping Bramblett's Broad Construction
The lower courts faced a dilemma with the Supreme Court's construc-
tion of § 1001 in Bramblett.98 Namely, the courts were concerned that
aggressive trial tactics traditionally utilized by defense attorneys might be
restrained, and effectiveness thereby impaired, by the prospect of over-
zealous prosecutors threatening or using the statute against the defense
attorneys themselves.99 Some circuits resolved this dilemma by creating a
"judicial" or "adjudicative" function exception to Bramblett's broad in-
terpretation and liberal construction of § 1001.1"0
When utilizing the judicial function exception, courts delineated be-
tween statements made to a court performing "house-keeping" or "ad-
ministrative" functions, and statements made to a court performing
"adjudicative" functions.10 1 If an unsworn false statement was made
while the court was performing an "adjudicative" function, there would
97. See Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 509-10. The Court stated: "That criminal statutes are to
be construed strictly is a proposition which calls for the citation of no authority. But this
does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in
complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature." Id. (citing United States ex rel. Mar-
cus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Spivey v. United States, 109 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1940)).
98. See United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760, 764 (2d Cir. 1991). The lower courts
were faced with two options after the Bramblett decision. See id. First, with Bramblett's
broad construction, the lower courts could conclude that any misrepresentation made to a
federal court was within the scope of § 1001. See id. Alternatively, the lower courts could
conclude that Bramblett's holding only applied to misrepresentations made within the
court's administrative province, and therefore false statements made to the judicial branch
would only be covered by § 1001 if the statements were made while the court was perform-
ing its administrative duties. See id. The courts preferred the latter, more narrow con-
struction. See id.
99. See Morgan v. United States, 309 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("We are certain
that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court intended [§ 1001] to include traditional trial
tactics within the statutory terms 'conceals or covers up."'); see also Hubbard v. United
States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1765 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (expressing concern over the possibility of overzealous prosecutors utilizing
§ 1001 to intimidate defense attorneys from vigorously representing their clients' interests).
100. See supra note 31 (providing list of cases adopting or rejecting the judicial function
exception).
101. See Masterpol, 940 F.2d at 766 (adopting the judicial function exception and hold-
ing that § 1001 does not apply because the submission to the court of a false letter of
recommendation during sentencing proceedings falls within the courts adjudicative func-
tions); Morgan, 309 F.2d at 237 (holding that a defendant who falsely held himself out as
an attorney and actually represented criminal defendants before the court was liable under
§ 1001).
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be no liability under § 1001; however, an unsworn false statement made
while the court was performing functions in its "administrative" capacity
gave rise to liability under § 1001.102 This delineation begged the ques-
tion of what was "administrative" and what was "adjudicative.' 0 3
The judicial function exception originates from dictum in Morgan v.
United States.'" In Morgan, the defendant assumed the name of a mem-
ber of the District of Columbia bar and falsely claimed to be an attor-
ney.10 5 Over fourteen months, the defendant made several appearances
in courts representing criminal defendants. 10 6  The defendant was
charged with violating § 1001 for concealing his name, identity, and non-
admission to the bar before the district court. 10 7 The defendant was con-
victed for these and other violations charged in the indictment. 108
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit affirmed the convictions. 0 9 In dictum, however, the court expressed
its certainty that neither Congress nor the Bramblett Court intended
§ 1001's statutory terms "conceals or covers up" to include traditional
trial tactics. 1 0 In support of this understanding the court posed some
rhetorical questions: If a defendant pleads not guilty when he knows the
opposite to be true, has he "covered up" a material fact? When an attor-
ney knows testimony to be true, but moves to exclude it as hearsay, has
he "covered up" a material fact? When an attorney knows his client to be
guilty, but nonetheless makes an impassioned summation in his client's
behalf, has the attorney "covered up" a material fact?"'
102. See United States v. Mayer, 775 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1985) (adopting the judi-
cial function exception and concluding that the sentencing process is part of the trial
court's adjudicative functions, and therefore, the defendant's submission of false letters of
recommendation during a sentencing proceeding does not fall within § 1001).
103. See supra note 27 (providing cases with contradictory determinations of what is
"administrative" and what is "adjudicative").
104. 309 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
105. See id. at 235.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 235-36. Morgan also was charged with four counts of falsely impersonat-
ing another person under D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1303 (1996); one count of perjuring him-
self in taking an oath of admission under D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2501 (1996) (repealed
1982); one count of forging a registration card under D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1401 (1996)
(repealed 1982); two counts of taking money from clients while pretending he was a li-
censed attorney under D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1301 (1996) (repealed 1982); and three
counts of forging a name on public records under 18 U.S.C. § 494 (1994). See id.
Sentences were imposed for a total of three to ten years to run concurrently. See id. at 236.
109. See id. at 238.
110. See id. at 237.
111. See id. No attorney, of course, would consider these actions to be criminal in na-
ture. The point of the questions is that the combination of a rigid reading of the statutory
language, with the Bramblett Court's holding that the judiciary falls within the scope of
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These actions, of course, fall within the purview of "traditional trial
tactics," and the court concluded that Bramblett's broad construction
could not possibly include such actions. 112 Accordingly, there must exist
some allowance for attorneys to utilize tactics that would best serve their
clients' interests without fear of prosecution. 113 Thus, Morgan's dictum
created the "adjudicative [or judicial] function exception." 114 In the
years following Morgan, a number of circuits adopted the exception,
while others questioned its underlying rationale."'
For example, in United States v. Erhardt,"6 the Sixth Circuit acknowl-
edged Morgan's dictum on the judicial function exception and implicitly
adopted the exception." 7 In Erhardt, the defendant was convicted of vi-
olating § 1001 for introducing and giving false testimony during a criminal
proceeding." 8 The Sixth Circuit reversed the defendant's § 1001 convic-
tion, holding that § 1001 did not apply to false documents introduced as
evidence in criminal proceedings. 1 9 The court reasoned that to hold
§ 1001, and an aggressive prosecutor with a grudge against an attorney, could lead to un-
necessary intimidation of the defense bar. See infra note 178 and accompanying text (not-
ing Justice Scalia's concern that prosecutors will attempt to intimidate criminal defense
attorneys with the threat of § 1001 charges).
112. See Morgan, 309 F.2d at 237.
113. See infra text accompanying note 178 (noting Justice Scalia's concern about the
chilling effect § 1001 may have on traditional trial tactics if applied to judicial proceedings).
114. See United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760, 766 (2d. Cir. 1991) (adopting the
adjudicative function exception).
115. See supra note 31 (providing a list of the federal circuits adopting or questioning
the judicial function exception).
116. 381 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1967).
117. See id. at 175. The adoption of the judicial function exception was implicit because
the court's primary concern was the two-witness rule in perjury prosecutions; its reversal of
the conviction was based primarily on that rule. See id. at 174-75. The court did, however,
follow Morgan's dictum in holding that "§ 1001 does not apply to the introduction of false
documents as evidence in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 175. In Hubbard, however, the
Sixth Circuit questioned Erhardt's holding concerning § 1001. See United States v. Hub-
bard, 16 F.3d 694, 701 (6th Cir. 1994), rev'd in part, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995). The court
concluded that Erhardt's foundation had been weakened by the abolition of the two-wit-
ness rule in perjury prosecutions. See id. The two-witness rule was the primary concern of
the Erhardt court. See id. The Sixth Circuit rejected the contention that its Erhardt deci-
sion had implicitly adopted the judicial function exception because the Morgan dictum, on
which the exception was based, did not create any such exception. See id.
118. See Erhardt, 381 F.2d at 174. In an earlier proceeding the defendant was charged
and acquitted of possession of stolen government property. See id. At the first trial the
defendant testified that he had purchased the property from a third party, and then pro-
duced a receipt the third party signed purportedly reflecting the purchase. See id. The
government brought an action against the defendant under § 1001 contending that both the
receipt and the testimony were false. See id.
119. See id. at 175.
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otherwise would undermine the effectiveness of the perjury statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1621.12°
The Ninth Circuit also adopted the judicial function exception in
United States v. Mayer.121 The defendant in Mayer submitted four ficti-
tious letters of recommendation to a district court during sentencing in a
separate proceeding.122 The defendant was charged with violating § 1001
for submitting the false letters to the court and was convicted by a jury. 23
The court reviewed Morgan and Erhardt and determined the judicial
function exception to be a valid doctrine. 124 The court stated that be-
cause this exception had existed since Morgan, and Congress had not re-
pudiated or refined the limitation, it was settled that the exception was
now part of the judicial landscape. 25 The court concluded that the sen-
tencing process was part of the trial court's adjudicative functions and
that the defendant's conduct did not violate § 1001.126 At least four other
circuits were in accord with the Mayer court in adopting the judicial func-
tion exception.'
27
The Seventh Circuit, however, questioned the rationale underlying the
exception and refused to adopt it in United States v. Barber.12 8 The de-
120. See id.; infra note 207 (providing the text of the perjury statute).
121. 775 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit previously addressed and implic-
itly accepted the exception in a case where an individual was convicted of violating § 1001
for giving a false name to a magistrate at an arraignment on unrelated charges so as to
conceal his prior criminal record. See id. at 1391 (citing United States v. Plascencia-
Orozco, 768 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court in Plascencia-Orozco upheld the convic-
tion because the magistrate's inquiry concerning the defendant's identity was a function of
his administrative duties and not an exercise of his judicial powers. See United States v.
Plascencia-Orozco, 768 F.2d at 1076.
122. See Mayer, 775 F.2d at 1388.
123. See id. The defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss was denied. See id. The de-
fendant was found guilty and moved successfully for a new trial. See id. Upon retrial he
again was found guilty on four counts of violating § 1001. See id.
124. See id. at 1389-90.
125. See id. at 1390.
126. See id. at 1392.
127. See United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that false
statements made to FBI agents acting under auspices of a federal grand jury were not
subject to § 1001 liability because the statements were "made in connection with a judicial
proceeding"); United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760, 766 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding the
submission of a false letter of recommendation during a sentencing hearing to be clearly
adjudicative and not subject to § 1001 liability); United States v. Holmes, 840 F.2d 246,
248-49 (4th Cir. 1988) (adopting the exception, but finding that the use of a false name
given to a magistrate and the filing of a form consenting to proceed before the magistrate
under the false name were administrative matters and therefore subject to liability under
§ 1001); United States v. Abrahams, 604 F.2d 386, 393 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that § 1001
is not the proper basis for charging a defendant with making a false statement during a bail
hearing).
128. 881 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1989).
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fendant in Barber, a former attorney on probation from a previous con-
viction for fraud, submitted fraudulent letters to a district court and the
United States District Attorney's Office impeaching a former client who
was about to be sentenced for an unrelated fraud.129 The defendant ar-
gued that the judicial function exception should apply. 130 The court
noted that the exception had yet to be accepted in the circuit, and thus,
the court found it unnecessary to directly address the "so-called 'trial tac-
tics' exception.' 131 The court declined to distinguish between the various
roles of a federal court because the defendant's false statements were
made during someone else's proceeding, not his own. 132 Because the
false statements were made in connection with someone else's trial, the
statements were not used as a "trial tactic" for his own defense.' 33 Ac-
cordingly, the policy concerns presented in Morgan were not present, and
therefore the exception was inapplicable to the defendant.
34
With the Sixth Circuit's Hubbard decision explicitly rejecting its prior
implicit adoption of the exception in Erhardt,'35 and with some circuits
questioning the exception's underlying rationale, 36 a split among the cir-
cuits created an issue ripe for the Supreme Court to resolve in Hubbard v.
United States.
137
129. See id. at 347. Barber's former client had conspired with Barber to defraud an
insurance company in an arson case so that Barber could collect his fees from the client for
representing the client in various civil, criminal, and bankruptcy matters. See id. at 346.
The former client became apprehensive of the conspiracy and began to cooperate with law
enforcement authorities-cooperation that eventually helped convict Barber of mail fraud
and bankruptcy fraud. See id.
130. See id. at 349.
131. Id. at 350.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. The court also concluded that the presentation of letters to a judge with
respect to a third party was not easily suitable to the perjury statutes, presumably because
of the difficulty in having the letters sworn to or certified, therefore, § 1001 presented the
most logical avenue for the deterrence of such frauds. See id.
135. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (discussing the Erhardt decision).
136. It is noteworthy that the District of Columbia Circuit, which is credited with creat-
ing the judicial function exception in Morgan, has criticized the circuits that have relied on
the Morgan dictum to establish the exception. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d
369, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (refusing to "extend the putative 'judicial function' exception" to
false statements made in the course of a legislative inquiry).
137. Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994) (granting certiorari).
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2. Traditional Stare Decisis in Light of Bramblett's Broad
Construction
The Supreme Court will not overrule precedent without compelling
justification.'1 8 The doctrine of stare decisis is deeply ingrained in the
American system of jurisprudence and is relied upon to provide consis-
tency in legal conclusions. 139 Absent special justification, the Court will
not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis. 1 40 The Court's support of its
prior holdings is even more pronounced in statutory construction
decisions.
141
One type of special justification used to overrule precedent exists
when, in the absence of a significant reliance interest, 42 there is an "in-
tervening development of the law.' 143 The judicial function exception, as
well as the Department of Justice's reluctance to use § 1001 for false
138. Cf Welch v. Texas Dep't. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987)
("[The] doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law.").
139. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (stating that stare decisis ensures
that "the law will not merely change erratically" and "permits society to presume that
bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals").
140. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (holding that "any departure
from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification").
141. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989). The Court
stated:
[Tihe burden borne by the party advocating the abandonment of an established
precedent is greater where the Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory
construction. Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statu-
tory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation,
the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we
have done.
Id. (second emphasis added) (citing as examples, Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff
Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736
(1977)).
142. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-56 (1992)
(joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (refusing to overturn precedent
where there was significant reliance interest in maintaining access to abortions); see also
Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (holding that stare
decisis has special force when legislators or citizens "have acted in reliance on a previous
decision").
143. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173. The Patterson Court declared that the primary reason
the Court overrules statutory precedent is because there has been an "intervening develop-
ment of the law," either through congressional action or judicial evolution "[w]here such
changes have removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior deci-
sion." Id. (citing as examples, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1989); Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 406 U.S. 320, 322-23
(1972)).
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statements made during judicial proceedings, 144 provided the Hubbard
plurality the special justification with which to overrule Bramblett.45
II. HUBBARD V. UNITED STA TESY OVERRULING BRA MBLETT IN
VINDICATION OF A 1954 DISTRICT COURT'S INTERPRETATION
OF 18 U.S.C. § 1001
A. The Majority Opinion: Applying Plain Meaning and Presumptive
Definitions to Interpret § 1001
In Hubbard v. United States, 4 6 the Supreme Court clarified the existing
split among the circuits over the scope of § 1001 and the validity of the
"judicial function" exception. 147 Justice Stevens, writing for the major-
ity,148 held that under § 1001, the judiciary did not fall within the meaning
of agency or department. 49 Moreover, the Court concluded that "Bram-
blett must be acknowledged as a seriously flawed decision."' 50
The Court first examined the terms "agency" and "department.' 5' It
referred to the Sixth Circuit's notation that ordinary usage suggested the
terms were inapplicable to the judicial or legislative branches.' 52 The
144. See infra note 168 and accompanying text (providing the language and the reason-
ing behind the Department of Justice Manual's recommendation concerning § 1001 prose-
cutions for false statements made during judicial proceedings).
145. See Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1763-65 (1995).
146. 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995).
147. See id. at 1765.
148. Parts 1, 11, 111 and VI were joined by a majority of the Court. See id. at 1756. Part
I provided the relevant facts and procedural history. See id. at 1756-57. Part II examined
§ 1001 and its terms, the definitions provided in § 6, and the basis for construing the statute
according to the presumptive definitions. See id. at 1757-58. Part III examined the legisla-
tive history of the Act and the Bramblett decision. See id. at 1758-61. Part VI provided the
holding of the Court, reversing the court of appeals's decision with respect to the § 1001
conviction, and overruling Bramblett. See id. at 1765.
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer also joined parts IV and V of Justice Stevens's opinion.
See id. at 1756. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Souter, filed a dissenting opinion. See id.
149. See id. at 1765.
150. Id. at 1758. The Court found it a significant error that the Bramblett Court did not
attempt to reconcile its interpretation with the presumptive definition of "department,"
and instead relied on a questionable review of legislative history. See id.
151. See id. at 1757.
152. See id. The Sixth Circuit noted:
At first glance, one might be tempted to believe that the plain language of the
statute prohibits application of § 1001 to the case at bar. In terms of ordinary
usage, "department" and "agency" connote the divisions of the executive branch,
e.g., the Treasury Department, the Department of Justice, the Environmental
Protection Agency, etc., and not the whole or any divisions of the judicial or legis-
lative branches-Congress is not the Department of Lawmaking, nor is the U.S.
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Court acknowledged that the word "department" occasionally had been
used to refer to the judiciary, but that it is not the ordinary usage.153 The
Court concluded that the statutory definitions of "agency" and "depart-
ment" in § 6 are consistent with the ordinary meaning of the terms, thus
creating a presumption in favor of such usage.154 Moreover, the Court
stated that an historical analysis of a statute should not outweigh the
plain meaning of the final text.'55
The Court declared that under the definition supplied by § 6, it is un-
questionable that "agency" does not refer to the courts. 156 The term "de-
partment," however, could apply to the judicial branch if the "context" of
§ 1001 showed that Congress intended such application. 157 The Court re-
ferred to its decision in Rowland v. California Men's Colony ,58 which
provides the method for determining when the presumptive definition
must accede to a different definition based on the statutory term's "con-
text." '159 Rowland requires an examination of "the text of the Act of
Congress surrounding the word at issue, or the texts of other related con-
gressional Acts.' 161 The Court found it unnecessary to review the legisla-
tive history of the Act because the § 6 definition of "department" allows
deviation only if the "context" of the text itself provides for such devia-
tion.161 Using the Rowland analysis, the Hubbard Court maintained that
nothing in the text of the statute or related legislation showed that Con-
gress did not intend the presumptive definition of "department" to ap-
Court of Appeals the Appellate Adjudication Agency. And, the statutory defini-
tions section of Title 18 seems to support this common sense view.
Hubbard v. United States, 16 F.3d 694, 698 n.4 (1994), rev'd in part, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995).
153. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1757 (citing Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
475, 500 (1867), as one example of the Court referring to the judicial branch as a
"department").
154. See id.; supra note 18 (providing statutory definitions of "department" and
"agency").
155. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1759.
156. See id. at 1757.
157. See id. at 1757-58. Section 6 provides that the term "department" applies to the
executive branches enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 1 (recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 101), "unless the
context shows that such term was intended to describe the executive, legislative, or judicial
branches of the government." 18 U.S.C. § 6 (1994) (emphasis added).
158. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1758 (citing Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506
U.S. 194, 199 (1993) (requiring a court to examine "the text of the Act of Congress sur-
rounding the word at issue, or the texts of other related congressional Acts")).
159. See id.
160. Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993).
161. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1758. The Court stated that "[i]f Congress had meant to
point further afield, as to legislative history, for example, it would have been natural to use
a more spacious phrase, like 'evidence of congressional intent,' in place of 'context."' Id.
(quoting Rowland, 506 U.S. at 200).
548 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 46:523
ply. 162 The Court suggested that because the statute's definition did not
extend to the courts, there may be no basis for the judicial function ex-
ception.163 The plurality, however, determined that it first had to address
Bramblett's broad interpretation of the statute and the issue of stare deci-
sis before determining the validity of the judicial function exception.' 64
The plurality asserted that because there was an intervening develop-
ment of the law, the "judicial function exception," there was justification
for disregarding stare decisis.161 Moreover, the plurality noted that the
reliance interests at stake were modest in view of the fact that numerous
other statutes exist to penalize false statements made within the judicial
branch.166
The plurality expressed doubt that prosecutors have relied on § 1001 as
a principal weapon in prosecuting those who make false statements to the
judicial branch. 67 The plurality pointed to evidence in the United States
Attorney's manual, which states that United States Attorneys should not
prosecute persons under § 1001 for making false statements to federal
courts. 68 The plurality further noted the fact that of the 2247 convictions
secured under § 1001 in the previous five years, false statements made to




165. See id. at 1764. Generally, the Court will overrule a decision based on statutory
construction only if there has been an "intervening development of the law" and there will
be no undue burden placed on those who have relied on the previous interpretation. See
id.; see also supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing "intervening development of
the law" rationale for overruling precedent).
166. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1764. The plurality listed four examples: "18 U.S.C.
§ 1621 (perjury); § 1623 (false declarations before grand jury or court); § 1503 (obstruction
of justice); § 287 (false claims against the United States)." Id.
167. See id.
168. See id. The Department of Justice Manual directs its prosecutors instead to pro-
ceed under § 1621 (perjury) or § 1503 (obstruction of justice). See DEPARTMENT OF JUST.
MANUAL tit. 9, § 9-69.267 (Supp. 1993). The government argued that the Manual's lan-
guage is a recommendation which is not binding upon prosecutorial discretion or statutory
construction, and further, that this recommendation was logical in light of the circuits'
adopting the judicial function exception. See Brief for the United States at 20 n.9, Hub-
bard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995) (No. 94-172).
169. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1764 n.15 (1995). The dissent identified five convic-
tions: United States v. Holmes, 840 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming the defendant's
conviction under § 1001 for signing a false signature on a consent form filed with a magis-
trate judge); United States v. Rowland, 789 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming the defend-
ant's conviction for violating § 1001 by filing a false performance bond in his personal and
corporate bankruptcy proceedings); United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(affirming the conviction of a defendant under § 1001 for omissions made in financial dis-
closure statements filed with the legislative branch under the Ethics in Government Act of
1978); United States v. Powell, 708 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming defendant's convic-
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In light of this, it concluded that no reliance interest was in jeopardy and,
accordingly, overruling Bramblett would not upset the balance in this
area of the law. 17° Thus, Hubbard's § 1001 convictions were reversed and
Bramblett was overruled.
1 71
B. Justice Scalia's Partial Concurrence: Looking to the "Unacceptable
Consequences" of Bramblett's Broad Interpretation as
Sufficient Reason to Disregard Stare Decisis
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred in part and con-
curred in the judgment.' 72 Justice Scalia agreed that Bramblett should be
overruled, but he did not agree with the plurality's reasoning for overrul-
ing precedent in this instance. 73 He did not agree that the lower courts'
creation of the judicial function exception was an intervening develop-
ment requiring the Court to elect between two conflicting lines of author-
ity.174 Rather, he argued that the significance of the judicially-created
exception was that it demonstrated the lower courts' recognition of the
"unacceptable consequences" created by Bramblett.175
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the "conceals or covers up" provision
of § 1001, a concern declared upon the creation of the judicial function
exception, 176 is violated only when there is a duty to disclose. 177 Never-
theless, he expressed concern that the threat of criminal prosecution
under such a broad interpretation of § 1001 could have a chilling effect on
tion under § 1001 for giving a false statement to the magistrate in applying for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis), rev'd, 469 U.S. 57 (1984); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (affirming conviction of a congressman for filing false and misleading Pay-
roll Authorization Forms with the House of Representatives Office of Finance); see also
Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1768 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
170. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1765.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1765-66 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
173. See id.
174. See id. at 1765 ("Such 'intervening developments' by lower courts that we do not
agree with are ordinarily disposed of by reversal.") (citing as an example, McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (reversing a lower court ruling that had relied on a
line of decisions construing the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994), and
holding that § 1341 was limited in scope to the protection of money or property rights, and
did not extend "to the intangible right of the citizenry to good government")).
175. See id.
176. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 110-12 (explaining concern with § 1001's
"conceals or covers up language").
177. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1765 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); see also United States v. Kingston, 971 F.2d 481, 489 (10th Cir. 1992) (conclud-
ing that to prove unlawful concealment of material facts under § 1001, it must first be
established that there was a duty to disclose).
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vigorous advocacy by criminal defense attorneys. 178 Furthermore, he
found no support in the text of the statute for the judicial function excep-
tion.179 Thus, Justice Scalia determined that the only principled alterna-
tive to the unacceptable consequences created by Bramblett's broad
interpretation of § 1001 was to overrule Bramblett.'80
Additionally, Justice Scalia dismissed the argument that any reliance
interest necessitated adherence to Bramblett's interpretation of § 1001.81
He acknowledged that some convictions obtained under Bramblett's in-
terpretation may be overturned, and that some defendants might go free
who could have been charged under another statute. 82 Nevertheless,
Justice Scalia maintained it was better to risk those results rather than to
allow prosecutors to intimidate defense attorneys with the possibility of
criminal charges for "concealing or covering up" the truth during adver-
sarial proceedings.' 83
C. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dissent.- Arguing for Strict Adherence to
Stare Decisis
In his dissent, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued forcefully for adherence to stare decisis.'" The Chief
Justice insisted that the plurality and concurrence offered justifications
for overruling precedent that fell "far short of the institutional hurdle
erected by our past practice against overruling a decision of this Court
interpreting an act of Congress."' 85
The Chief Justice rejected the "intervening development of law" ra-
tionale as an outright subversion of the very principle of stare decisis.' 86
178. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1765 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). These concerns are essentially the same as those posed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Morgan. See Morgan v. United States,
309 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1962).




182. See id.; see also infra note 213 (listing cases where charges were dismissed or con-
victions reversed as a direct result of the Hubbard decision).
183. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1766. Justice Scalia stated:
Some convictions obtained under Bramblett may have to be overturned, and in a
few instances wrongdoers may go free who could have been prosecuted and con-
victed under a different statute if Bramblett had not been assumed to be the law.
I count that a small price to pay for the uprooting of this weed.
Id.
184. See id. at 1766-69 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also supra note 6 (providing the
definition of stare decisis).
185. Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1766 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
186. See id.
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The intervening development of law is justified only if the "intervening
development" was in the case law of the Supreme Court, not a develop-
ment of the lower courts, such as the judicial function exception.
187
Moreover, he argued that the plurality's basis for dismissing the reliance
interest was debatable, if not erroneous.
188
In discussing the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis in statutory
interpretation, the Chief Justice argued that if Bramblett was to be over-
turned, it should be at the hands of Congress.18 9 The Chief Justice con-
cluded that the Court should refrain from so easily dismissing long-
standing precedent. 9 °
III. LICENSE TO LIE OR PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL TRIAL
TECHNIQUES?
For some, the Hubbard decision opened a loophole in the law that
would give carte blanche to those determined to lie to Congress or the
courts.191 The Court's holding, however, though applauded by defense
attorneys and their clients, 192 did not leave prosecutors without means to
target persons who knowingly and willfully lied to the federal govern-
ment. 93 Notably, § 1001 still applied to false statements made to agen-
cies or departments of the executive branch. 94 The plurality in Hubbard
noted that the government had secured two thousand convictions under
§ 1001 over the last five years; however, the dissent could identify only
five of those convictions as brought in connection with false statements
187. See id. at 1767; see also supra note 31 (listing cases adopting the judicial function
exception).
188. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1766 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
189. See id. at 1766-67.
190. See id.
191. See Hearings on H.R. 1678 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Bill Martini, Congressman), 1995 WL
410918 (F.D.C.H.) (June 30, 1995). Congressman Martini, a former prosecutor, stated that
"without a viable federal False Statement Statute government officials and others will be
able to engage in acts of fraud and misconduct against the legislative and judicial branches
of government without fear of prosecution." Id.
192. Cf Naftali Bendavid, Campaign Creeps Up On Senate Crime Bill, N.J. L.J., July
24, 1995 at 37 (providing comments by defense attorneys disconcerted with congressional
efforts to overrule the Hubbard decision).
193. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994) (criminalizing and sanctioning contempt); id. §§ 1501-
1517 (providing criminal sanctions for obstruction of justice); id. § 1621 (criminalizing and
sanctioning perjury); id. § 1622 (providing criminal sanctions for subornation of perjury);
id. § 1623 (providing criminal sanctions for false declarations). Additionally, Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certification for submitted documents, by
which submission of insupportable contentions or facts may give rise to sanctions. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3)-(4).
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 6 (defining the term "department" as one of the executive depart-
ments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)).
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made to the judiciary or legislature.195 This statistic illustrates the propo-
sition that the Court's decision did not seem to pose a significant threat to
our adversarial system of justice.
196
A. The Hubbard Decision: Limited Effect on Judicial Proceedings
Despite the dire warnings of some, Hubbard's ruling would not have
significantly affected the procedures or tactics normally utilized in adver-
sarial proceedings.197 The circuits had already adopted the judicial func-
tion exception to exclude "traditional trial tactics" from the scope of
§ 1001.198 Further, despite Justice Scalia's concern that the threat of
criminal prosecution under § 1001 might have a chilling effect on "vigor-
ous representation of opposing interests in adversarial litigation,"' 99
there is no evidence that prosecutors used § 1001 against defense attor-
neys for representing clients vigorously.200
Moreover, it is impossible to prevent willing lawyers from skirting the
truth while representing clients, regardless of statutory prohibition.2"'
195. See supra note 169 (citing the five convictions the dissent identified).
196. Undoubtedly, few people believe that crimes should go unpunished simply be-
cause of perceived loopholes in the laws. However, as Justice Scalia concluded in his con-
currence, it is sometimes necessary to allow wrongs to go unpunished rather than to allow
bad laws to stand. See Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1766 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
197. Some of the "tactics" that might be construed as "conceal[ing] or cover[ing] up"
under § 1001 include: general denials in answers to complaints, see Harvey Berkman, Bill
to Ensnare "Liars" May Widen Criminal Net, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 1995, at A9; or narrowly
interpreting discovery requests or subpoenas duces tecum, and therefore, turning over
fewer documents than the adversarial party expects, see United States v. Deffenbagh In-
dus., Inc., 957 F.2d 749, 754 (10th Cir. 1992) ("To give the Department of Justice power to
prosecute allegedly false statements under § 1001 in connection with ... a subpoena would
give the government a more powerful weapon than we believe Congress intended.").
198. See supra note 31 (listing circuits adopting or rejecting the exception).
199. Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1765 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment). Surprisingly, while Justice Scalia supported his reasoning for overruling Bramblett
with this concern, he offered no concrete examples of abuses that would give rise to this
concern. Surely, prosecutorial abuses would have manifested themselves over the 40 years
in which Bramblett was law. While Justice Scalia's concern may be valid, the legal commu-
nity expects one of the preeminent Justices of our time to provide concrete examples to
sufficiently support and illustrate his argument.
200. Cf. Brief for the United States at 29, Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754
(1995) (No. 94-172) (claiming that "[s]ection 1001 does not penalize traditional trial tactics
... because such tactics have never included the making of intentionally false statements of
fact").
201. See, e.g., Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 320 (1949) (upholding order by the
Commissioner of Patents barring an attorney from practicing before the United States Pat-
ent Office for false representations made to the Patent Office); Cooper v. State, 309 N.E.2d
807, 808 (Ind. 1974) (admonishing the attorney of a criminal defendant for embellishing
the facts of the case in his brief); In re Verdiramo, 475 A.2d 45, 47-48 (N.J. 1984) (adopting
the Disciplinary Review Board's recommendation of retroactive suspension of a lawyer
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While this type of conduct was no longer prosecutable under § 1001 after
Hubbard, there were other ways to penalize such conduct, such as mone-
tary sanctions provided for under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.2 "2 Admittedly, this type of penalty may not strike the same
degree of fear into attorneys as the prospect of imprisonment. The possi-
bility, however, of severe monetary sanctions,2 °3 disbarment,2° or sus-
pension 205 should provide most attorneys with sufficient incentive to
uphold their duty to remain truthful in their representations as officers of
the court.20 6
convicted of obstruction of justice for tampering with a witness about to go before a grand
jury to testify about the attorney's client).
202. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (providing sanctions against attorneys and unrepresented
parties for knowingly submitting certified false documentation to the court). See generally
GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (2d ed. 1994)
(providing an extensive analysis of the sanctions available to the courts under the federal
rules).
203. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (providing judges with the power to penalize attor-
neys monetarily for violation of the Rule); GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS:
CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES § 9.03[a] (2d ed. 1995) (discussing
monetary sanctions for Rule 11 violations); see also Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire
Cloth Co., 919 F.2d 1579, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (imposing monetary sanctions where both
parties sought to obfuscate the truth); El-Gharabli v. INS, 796 F.2d 935, 939-40 (7th Cir.
1986) (imposing a $500 fine upon counsel for deliberately misleading the court); Kleiner v.
First Nat'l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193, 1209-10 (11th Cir. 1985) (imposing a $50,000 fine upon
counsel for intentional misconduct, including lying to the court).
204. See In re Spicer, 126 F.2d 288, 292 (6th Cir. 1942) (affirming the disbarment of an
attorney for subornation of witnesses); Holmes v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 498 So. 2d
837, 841 (Miss. 1986) (disbarring an attorney under Rule 6(a) of the Mississippi Rules of
Discipline for testifying falsely during grand jury proceedings); In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782,
786 (N.Y. 1917) (affirming the disbarment of an attorney for obstruction of justice); In re
Kerr, 548 P.2d 297, 302 (Wash. 1976) (ordering the disbarment of an attorney for suborna-
tion of perjury); In re Bixby, 198 P.2d 672, 674 (Wash. 1948) (same).
205. See DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 846 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1988) (sus-
pending an attorney for two months for making false and misleading statements to the
court regarding the record of the case); In re Metzger, 31 Haw. 929, 934-36 (1931) (af-
firming the suspension of an attorney who deliberately misrepresented an exhibit while
cross-examining a handwriting expert); Mississippi Bar v. Mathis, 620 So. 2d 1213, 1222
(Miss. 1993) (suspending an attorney for one year for deceiving the court and opposing
counsel); In re Lindsey, 810 P.2d 1237, 1240 (N.M. 1991) (increasing Disciplinary Board's
recommendation of probation to six months suspension for deliberately deceiving the
court and opposing counsel).
206. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1992). Rule 3.3 re-
quires complete candor from the attorney to the court. Id. The rule states in part:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdic-
tion known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 46:523
If prosecutors and courts wished to maintain the possibility of criminal
sanctions against persons who knowingly and willfully made false state-
ments during judicial proceedings, they needed only to be diligent in de-
manding that all such statements be made under oath and certified as
true. Such action would subject persons making these statements to per-
jury charges if such statements were proven false. 07
B. Effect on the Legislative Branch
Absent congressional response, Hubbard's effect on the legislative
branch would have been less acceptable than on the judicial branch. Be-
cause the Hubbard Court construed § 1001's terms according to their pre-
sumptive definitions, namely, that "agency" and "department" apply only
to the executive branch, it followed that § 1001 no longer applied to false
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.
Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1980)
(providing that a lawyer shall not "[k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact").
One scholar has stated that "the [Hubbard] decision did not make it legal to lie in court.
False testimony is subject to perjury laws. Judges can give those lawyers who lie fines and
jail time; state disciplinary boards can bar or suspend lawyers who misrepresent facts."
Jarett B. Decker, Defense Lawyers on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1995, at A27.
207. The perjury statute, found at section 1621 of title 18, states:
Whoever-
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any
case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered,
that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and con-
trary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not
believe to be true; or
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of
perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully
subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true;
is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This sec-
tion is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without
the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994).
There is, moreover, a companion statute covering false declarations made before a grand
jury or court, which is found at section 1623 of title 18. The statute states:
Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, verification, or state-
ment under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United
States Code) in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of
the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or
uses any other information, including any book, paper, document, record, record-
ing, or other material, knowing the same to contain any false material declaration,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id. § 1623(a).
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statements made to the legislative branch.2 °8 Indeed, Hubbard overruled
a case in which an ex-Congressman was charged under § 1001 with mak-
ing false statements to the Disbursing Office of the House of
Representatives.209
The ruling had immediate repercussions in the legislative domain.210
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit asked the district court to reconsider motions to dismiss
six counts charging former Congressman Dan Rostenkowski with § 1001
violations for making false statements to Congress and the Federal Elec-
tion Commission.211 Following Hubbard, the district court granted the
motions to dismiss the counts for false statements made to Congress.212
That ruling, and others like it, increased pressure on Congress to
amend § 1001 so that false statements made to Congress would be
prosecutable.2z 3 Indeed, legislation was quickly introduced during the
208. The majority stated that "there is nothing in the text of the statute, or in any re-
lated legislation, that even suggests-let alone 'shows'-that the normal definition of 'de-
partment' was not intended." Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1995). The
normal definition the Court was referring to is that provided in § 6 of title 18, which de-
fines "department" as "one of the executive departments ... unless the context shows that
such term was intended to describe [another] branch[ ] of the government." 18 U.S.C. § 6
(emphasis added).
209. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1765.
210. See United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1301-13 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (re-
manding to the District Court for the District of Columbia to entertain such motions as the
parties may make in light of Hubbard).
211. See id. at 1313.
212. See United States v. Rostenkowski, Crim. No. 94-0226, 1996 WL 342110, at *3
(D.D.C. Mar. 12, 1996) (dismissing the counts charging the congressman with making false
statements to the House Finance Office in violation of § 1001). Indeed, dropping the
§ 1001 charges may have made it easier for the parties to agree to a plea bargain in which
Rostenkowski was charged only with two counts of felony mail fraud. Cf David E. Rosen-
baum, Rostenkowski Pleads Guilty to Mail Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at A20. Ex-
Congressman Rostenkowski was sentenced to a seventeen month prison sentence and
fined $100,000. See id.
213. As a result of Hubbard, criminal charges and convictions were dismissed in several
cases involving false statements to the legislative branch. See, e.g., United States v. Dean,
55 F.3d 640, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (reversing convictions based on § 1001 violations),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996); Rostenkowski, 1996 WL 342110, at *1 (dismissing all
§ 1001 counts charging the former congressman with making false statements to Congress);
United States v. Oakar, 924 F. Supp. 232, 237-38 (D.D.C. 1996) (dismissing one count
charging former Congresswoman Mary Rose Oakar with filing a false Financial Disclosure
Statement with the Clerk of the House of Representatives in violation of § 1001); United
States v. Watt, 911 F. Supp. 538, 543 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding statements made to a House
subcommittee not chargeable under § 1001); United States v. Hansen, 906 F. Supp. 688,
693-94 (D.D.C. 1995); see also Prepared Statement of Robert S. Litt, Deputy Assistant Attor-
ney General, Criminal Division, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Concerning
Amendments to the False Statements Act, FED. NEWS SERVICE, May 14, 1996 (discussing the
need for amending § 1001), available in WL, Legislative Library, Federal News File; Elkan
Abramowitz, The Limitation of U.S.C. § 1001 to the Executive Branch, N.Y. L.J., July 5,
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first session of the 104th Congress to accomplish that result.2 14 The
"Government Accountability Act of 1995," informally titled the "Hub-
bard Bill," proposed to amend the language of § 1001 from "any depart-
ment or agency of the United States," to "the executive, legislative, or
judicial branch, or any department thereof., 215 That change in language
would have explicitly brought cases like Rostenkowski within the realm of
§ 1001 liability.216 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hubbard
and the high-profile case of ex-Congressman Rostenkowski, it was un-
questionable that some form of congressional action would be taken to
criminalize unsworn false statements made to the legislative branch.217
C. Congressional Response to Hubbard v. United States: Avoiding
Vulnerability and Allowing for a Judicial Proceedings
Exception
Congress swiftly reacted to the Hubbard decision.218  Both chambers
during the second session of the 104th Congress introduced bills to re-
store § 1001's scope to its pre-Hubbard dimension; thus again making
1995, at 3 ("[T]he Supreme Court may have just taken away the most powerful weapon in
prosecuting those who lie to Congress.").
214. See Elkan Abramowitz, Criminal Cases in the Supreme Court, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 5,
1995, at 11 (discussing the introduction of the bill by Rep. William Martini of New Jersey).
215. See id
216. Paul Morris, the attorney who represented Hubbard, expressed his concern over
the proposed legislation: "'If this legislation is passed, every lawyer has to wonder every
time he writes the word "denied" in an answer to a complaint ... whether he can be
charged with a crime."' See id. (omission in original).
217. See infra notes 219-54 and accompanying text (discussing legislation extending
§ 1001's reach to false statements made to the legislative and judicial branches).
218. Indeed, legislation to overrule Hubbard was introduced during the 1st Session of
the 104th Congress by Congressman William Martini. See Abramowitz, Criminal Cases,
supra note 214, at 11 n.24. The bill would have changed the language of § 1001 from any
"department or agency of the United States," to "the executive, legislative, or judicial
branch, or any department thereof." Id. The bill was introduced as H.R. 1678, the "Gov-
ernment Accountability Act of 1995." See Rocco Commarere, Federal Defense Lawyers
Face Jail for Half-Truths, N.J. LAW., July 10, 1995, at 1. The introduction of the bill created
an uproar with defense attorneys, and it seemed a certainty that an exception would need
to be created for defense attorneys when defending their clients if the bill was to have any
chance of passing. Cf Bendavid, supra note 192, at 37. The defense lawyers' main concern
was the broad language of the bill. See id. That language, they feared, would provide
overzealous prosecutors with an opportunity to intimidate defense lawyers such that their
"zeal for mounting an energetic defense" might be crippled. Id.; cf Hubbard v. United
States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1765 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment) (reasoning that Bramblett has unacceptable consequences which may "deter vigor-
ous representation of opposing interests in adversarial litigation, particularly
representation of criminal defendants, whose adversaries control the machinery of § 1001
prosecution"). The bill did not make it to the floor during the 1st session, but was reintro-
duced during the second session as H.R. 3166, with a subsection providing for a judicial
function exception. See infra note 221 (providing text of H.R. 3166 as introduced).
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material false statements made to the judicial and legislative branches
prosecutable.219 The bills attempted, however, to accommodate the con-
cerns of defense attorneys and judges regarding statements made to the
judiciary.22 °
Subsection (a) of the original House amendment to § 1001, introduced
as H.R. 3166, proscribed false statements from being made "in any matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of
the Government of the United States. '221 Subsection (b) provided that
"[s]ubsection (a) does not apply.., to a party to a judicial proceeding, or
that party's counsel, for statements, representations, writings or docu-
ments submitted by such party or counsel to a judge in that
proceeding. ,222
The original Senate bill, S. 1734,223 proscribed false statements "in any
matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial
219. The House introduced the legislation as H.R. 3166, the "Government Accountabil-
ity Act of 1996." See H.R. 3166, 104th Cong. (1996). The Senate introduced its version as
S. 1734, the "False Statements Penalty Restoration Act." See. S. 1734, 104th Cong. (1996).
220. See infra notes 227-37 and accompanying text (discussing the two chambers' at-
tempts to create a satisfactory judicial function exception).
221. The version of the House bill as introduced provided:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Government Accountability Act of 1996".
SECTION 2. RESTORATION OF FALSE STATEMENT PENALTIES.
Section 1001 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
"§ 1001. Statements or entries generally
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within
the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Gov-
ernment of the United States, knowingly or willfully-
"(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a mate-
rial fact;
"(2) makes any material false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or repre-
sentation; or
"(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to con-
tain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
"(b) Subsection (a) does not apply-
(1) to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's counsel, for state-
ments, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party
or counsel to a judge in that proceeding.".
H.R. 3166, 104th Cong. (1996) (version 1).
222. See id. (providing text of bill as originally introduced).
223. The Senate bill provided as follows:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "False Statements Penalty Restoration Act."
SEC. 2. RESTORING FALSE STATEMENTS PROHIBITION.
Section 1001 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
"1001. Statements or entries generally
"(a) PROHIBITED CONDUCT.-
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branch of the United States Government, or any department, agency,
committee, subcommittee, or office thereof. '224 The Senate's original
version of the judicial function exception was stated differently than the
House's. 225 The Senate's amendment to § 1001, subsection (a)(2), stated
"(1) IN GENERAL.-A person shall be punished under subsection (b) if, in
any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judi-
cial branch of the United States Government, or any department,
agency, committee, subcommittee, or office thereof, that person know-
ingly and willfully-
"(A) falsifies, conceals, or covers up, by any trick, scheme, or device, a
material fact;
"(B) makes any material false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or
"(C) makes or uses any false writing or document, knowing that the
document contains any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or entry.
"(2) APPLICABILITY.-This section shall not apply to statements, represen-
tations, writings, or documents submitted to a court in connection with
the performance of an adjudicative function.
"(b) PENALTIES.-A person who violates this section shall be fined under this
title, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.".
S. 1734, 104 Cong. (1996) (as introduced).
Section 3 of the Senate version also amended § 1515 of title 18 of the United States Code
to define the term "corruptly" in order to clarify the prohibition on obstructing Congress.
The amendment inserted in section 3 states: "(b) As used in section 1505, the term 'cor-
ruptly' means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, in-
cluding, but not limited to, making a false or misleading statement, or withholding,
concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information." See id. This provi-
sion was intended to reverse the decision of United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 379
(D.C. Cir. 1991), where the court reversed the obstruction of justice conviction of former
National Security Advisor John Poindexter, holding that the term "corruptly" is too vague
to provide constitutionally adequate notice that the statute prohibits lying to Congress. See
Prepared Statement of Robert S. Litt, supra note 213, at 7-9 (discussing reasons necessitat-
ing the amendment of § 1515).
Further, section 4 of the Senate's version amended § 1365(a) of title 28 to target explic-
itly the Executive Branch, making a senate subpoena unenforceable only when the person
under subpoena is a person in the
Executive Branch of the Federal Government acting within his or her official ca-
pacity, if the head of the department or agency employing the officer or employee
has directed the officer or employee not to comply with the subpoena or order
and identified the Executive Branch privilege or objection underlying such
direction.
S. 1734, § 4 (as introduced); see also Statement of Robert S. Litt, supra note 213, at 10
(objecting to expansion of the Senate's authority to enforce subpoenas against the execu-
tive branch).
Finally, section 5 of the Senate bill amended § 6005 of title 18 which addresses compel-
ling truthful testimony from immunized witnesses. See S. 1734, § 5. The amendment ad-
ded the phrase "or ancillary to" after the phrase "any proceeding before" in subsections
(a) and (b). Id.
224. S. 1734, § 2.
225. Compare H.R. 3166, § 2, with S. 1734, § 2.
[Vol. 46:523
1997] Congressional Response to Hubbard v. United States 559
that "[t]his section shall not apply to statements, representations, writ-
ings, or documents submitted to a court in connection with the perform-
ance of an adjudicative function." '226
Thus, the proposed amendments attempted to accommodate the judi-
cial function concerns expressed by defense attorneys and the courts.2 27
The Senate's approach distinguished between false statements made to a
court while performing its adjudicative functions and false statements
made to a court while performing other functions.22s The House version
made no attempt to make the adjudicative/administrative distinction.229
Rather, it excepted from the false statement prohibition all statements
made to a judge by a party, or that party's counsel, during a judicial
proceeding.
230
On the one hand, the Senate's exception was more narrow than the
House's exception in that the Senate's version only applied to false state-
ments made in connection with a court's adjudicative functions,
23 1
whereas the House's version applied to false statements made by a party
during a judicial proceeding.232 On the other hand, the Senate's version
was broader because it applied to statements made to a court performing
an adjudicative function,233 while the House's exception only applied if
226. S. 1734, § 2.
227. See supra notes 98-134 (discussing the judicial function exception).
228. See S. 1734, § 2; see also Statement of Robert S. Litt, supra note 213, at 3-7 (explain-
ing why the Senate's proposal to make the exception apply only while the courts perform
their "adjudicative" functions was unworkable). Deputy Assistant Attorney General Litt,
in a prepared statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, explained why the distinction
between the courts' "administrative" functions and "adjudicative" functions would not be
an acceptable method of meeting the concerns of the legal profession. See id. at 5. He
noted that the courts themselves had difficulty determining what was "adjudicative" and
what was "administrative." See id. As examples of this difficulty, he compared United
States v. Plascencia-Orozco, 768 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1985), where the court held that giving
a false name to a magistrate judge during a plea hearing was prosecutable because it was
"administrative," with United States v. Abrahams, 604 F.2d 386, 395 (5th Cir. 1979), where
the court held that giving a false name to a magistrate judge during a removal/bail hearing
was "adjudicative" and, therefore, outside the scope of § 1001. See id.
229. See H.R. 3166, § 2.
230. See id.
231. See S. 1734, § 2; Statement of Robert S. Litt, supra note 213, at 3 (discussing the
Senate's proposed "adjudicative" function exception).
232. See H.R. 3166, § 2.
233. See S. 1734, § 2; Statement of Robert S. Litt, supra note 213, at 3-5. Assistant At-
torney General Litt noted that the House version would limit the scope of the exception
because only those statements made to a "judge" would be subject to the exception. See
id. at 3. He stated that the limitation was important for two reasons. First, the Depart-
ment of Justice felt that the false statements made to other entities within the judicial
branch, such as the Administrative Office of the Courts, grand juries, and the United States
Probation Office, should be subject to prosecution. Second, the Department of Justice felt
it imperative that false statements made to law enforcement officers made in connection
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the false statement was made to a judge .234 The final bill235 incorporated
the main text of the House version, with some amendments to other sec-
tions of the United States Code from the Senate version.236 There also
was one revision to the judicial proceedings subsection of the original
House version: the term "or magistrate" was added after the word
"judge. 237
with judicial proceedings be subject to prosecution under § 1001. See id. at 6-7. Mr. Litt
noted the consequences of a broad judicial exception, pointing out the decision in United
States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692 (10th Cir. 1993), where the court reversed the conviction of a
person who lied to FBI agents conducting a grand jury investigation. See id. at 7.
234. See H.R. 3166, § 2; Statement of Robert S. Litt, supra note 213, at 6 (discussing the
preference of having the exception apply to statements made to "judges" rather than
"other entities within the judicial branch").
235. The relevant text of the bill as passed provides as follows:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "False Statements Accountability Act of 1996".
SEC. 2. RESTORING FALSE STATEMENTS PROHIBITION.
Section 1001 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
"1001. Statements or entries generally
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within
the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Gov-
ernment of the United States, knowingly and willfully-
"(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme or device a mate-
rial fact;
"(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or repre-
sentation; or
"(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to con-
tain any material false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
"(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that
party's counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents sub-
mitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding.
"(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch,
subsection (a) shall apply only to-
"(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter related
to the procurement of property or services, personnel or employment
practices, or support services, or a document required by law, rule, or
regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office or officer
within the legislative branch; or
"(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any
committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, con-
sistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate."
H.R. Res. 535, 104th Cong. (1996). The bill also included the Senate's proposed amend-
ments affecting other sections of the United States Code. See id.
236. See supra note 223 (providing text of amendments affecting other sections of the
United States Code).
237. See H.R. Res. 535, § 2.
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The final version also included a subsection addressing false statements
made to the legislative branch.23 8 The new subsection prohibited false
statements made to the legislature concerning administrative matters,
such as procurement, payment claims, and personnel or employment
claims;239 or statements made during any congressional investigation or
review.24o
Although the amended 18 U.S.C. § 1001 includes a judicial proceedings
exception,24' it is likely the provision will create uncertainty in several
areas. First, it allows unsworn false statements to be made to a judge or
magistrate during judicial proceedings.242 This raises the issue of whether
the exception applies only to statements made to Article III judges,243 but
not statements made to administrative law judges (ALJs).244 If the judi-
cial function exception does not apply to ALJs, an attorney may be prose-
cuted for making a false statement to an ALJ during adjudicative
proceedings in the executive branch, but the same statement made to an
Article III judge would not subject the attorney to prosecution.245 The
rationale underlying the exception, however, applies whether an attorney
is advocating in front of an Article III judge or an ALJ.246 The subsec-
tion fails to address this anomaly, and instead creates an exception only
for statements made to "a judge or magistrate. 2 47 Thus, false statements
made to a judicial clerk or a clerk of the court technically do not qualify
for the exception. Therefore, an attorney making a false statement to a
238. See supra note 235 (providing text of subsection (c) of the enacted amendment
exempting from punishment certain false statements made to Congress).
239. This particular provision clarifies the statute's scope by expressly stating that only
false statements made in a specific context to the legislative branch are punishable. See
supra note 235 (providing text of amended § 1001(c)(1)); see also 142 CONG. REC. S11,605-
06 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (remarks of Sen. Specter explaining the scope of the false
statements provision for false statements made to Congress).
240. See supra note 235 (providing text of amended § 1001(c)(2)); see also 142 CONG.
REc. S11,605-06 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (remarks of Sen. Specter explaining the scope of
the false statements provision for false statements made to Congress during congressional
investigations or reviews).
241. See H.R. Res. 535 (amending § 1001(b)).
242. See id.
243. See U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 1 (authorizing appointment of federal judgeships).
244. "Administrative Law Judges [(ALJs)] preside at [executive] agency hearings." 1
JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 6.01, at 6-3 (1996). ALJs have immense
judicial power much like those afforded Article III trial judges. See id. § 6.01, at 6-6.
ALJs, however, "deliver recommendations [rather than] final decision[s,] as their power is
subordinate to that of the agency" for whom they serve. Id. § 6.01, at 6-3.
245. See H.R. Res. 535 (providing in the amendment of § 1001(b) that the judicial pro-
ceeding exception only applies to false statements made to "judges or magistrates").
246. See supra notes 98-134 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale underlying
the judicial function exception).
247. H.R. Res. 535 (amending § 1001(b)).
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judge's clerk or to a clerk of the court may fall outside the subsection (b)
exception.248
Second, the term "judicial proceeding" could be considered ambigu-
ous.249 To some, the term might contemplate any judicial activity occur-
ring after a civil complaint is filed 25° or a criminal indictment is handed
down.25' To others, it could mean only those activities that occur during
the trial or hearing phase of a proceeding.252 Thus, questions may arise
concerning the precise meaning of the term "judicial proceeding." For
example, some might argue that a pre-trial conference 253 technically is
not a judicial proceeding, while others would argue that such a confer-
ence is a judicial proceeding. Ultimately, the courts will be called upon to
determine the scope of the judicial proceeding exception.254
D. Stare Decisis: Alive and Well
Chief Justice Rehnquist based his dissent on stare decisis.255 His con-
cern was that the justification the plurality relied upon to support its deci-
sion to overrule Bramblett-that the judicial function exception was an
intervening development of the law-was entirely subversive to the prin-
ciple of stare decisis. 256 He argued that by accepting the "intervening
248. See id. (providing in amended § 1001(b) that only false statements made to "a
judge or magistrate" are subject to the judicial function exception); cf. Statement of Robert
S. Litt, supra note 213, at 6 (noting that only false statements made to a judge are exempt
from prosecution).
249. The term "judicial proceeding" is not defined in title 18 of the United States Code.
The only provision that provides some type of definition is 28 U.S.C. § 1827(j), which de-
fines the term "judicial proceedings instituted by the United States." That provision
provides:
[Als used in this section [the term] refers to all proceedings, whether criminal or
civil, including pretrial and grand jury proceedings (as well as proceedings upon a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus initiated in the name of the United States by a
relator) conducted in, or pursuant to the lawful authority and jurisdiction of a
United States district court.
18 U.S.C. § 18270) (1994) (emphasis added).
250. See FED. R. Civ. P. 3-10 (establishing protocol for the filing of complaints in civil
cases).
251. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) (establishing the necessity of an indictment in criminal
cases that are punishable either by death or imprisonment of more than one year).
252. In defining the term "judicial proceeding," Black's Law Dictionary cross-refer-
ences the word "trial." See BLACK'S LAW DICMtONARY 849 (6th ed. 1990).
253. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (providing the court with discretionary authority to require
all parties to a civil proceeding to conduct a pre-trial conference in order to facilitate the
quick and efficient administration of justice).
254. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial branch's role as
the ultimate interpreters of the law).
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development of the law" that the lower courts created, the Court was
inducing the lower courts to create bodies of law attempting to effectively
overrule Supreme Court decisions with which they disagree.257 He rea-
soned that this possibility was enough in itself to warrant the upholding of
precedent, even though that precedent may be "really wrong" according
to sitting justices.258
This concern over the potential harm to the doctrine of stare decisis
may seem valid; however, even if the lower courts attempt to overrule a
Supreme Court holding by creating an "intervening development of law,"
the Court itself has the authority to strike the "intervening develop-
ment., 259 Further, to the extent that current justices may utilize an "in-
tervening development" to overrule precedent, one need not doubt that a
majority of justices intent on overruling bad law could avoid stare decisis
by reasoning other than an "intervening development of the law. '26 ° The
doctrine of stare decisis is so ingrained in our jurisprudential system
2 61
that it cannot convincingly be argued that the overruling of one case in-
terpreting an obscure criminal statute poses any real threat to the doc-
trine itself.
E. The Method of Statutory Interpretation in Hubbard
The Hubbard majority determined that it was appropriate to strictly
construe § 1001 by applying the statutory definitions to the plain lan-
guage of the text.262 The Court's strict construction of the statute is indic-
ative of the Court's recent jurisprudence.263 It is not difficult to conclude
257. See id.
258. Id. at 1769 ("The opinion of one justice that another's view of a statute was wrong,
even really wrong, does not overcome the institutional advantages conferred by adherence
to stare decisis in cases where the wrong is fully redressable by a coordinate branch of
government.").
259. See id. at 1765 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("Such
'intervening developments' by lower courts that we do not agree with are ordinarily dis-
posed of by reversal.") (citing as an example, McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350
(1987)).
260. See id. (concluding that precedent posing "unacceptable consequences" that can
only be judicially avoided by creating exceptions with no basis in law, or by irrational
limitations, should be overruled with little hesitation); see also SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD
J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS, apps. I-II (1995) (listing and discussing overruled and over-
ruling decisions of the Supreme Court from 1948-1992).
261. See generally BRENNER & SPAETH, supra note 260 (providing in-depth analysis of
the common law's reliance on the doctrine of stare decisis).
262. See Hubbard, 115 S. Ct. at 1759 ("We are convinced that the [Bramblett] Court
erred by giving insufficient weight to the plain language of §§ 6 and 1001 .... [A] historical
analysis normally provides less guidance to a statute's meaning than its final text.").
263. See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 922 n.2 (providing cases in which the current Court is
narrowing the focus of its "consideration to the statutory text and its 'plain meaning"').
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that the law is more predictable and reasonable when the Court construes
statutory law according to the plain meaning of the text. 64 It is equally
clear that this "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpretation is the
favorable method of interpretation among the Justices of the current
Court,2 65 as it is conspicuous that no mention or objection was made to
this approach by any of the Court's members. The only argument the
dissent offered was based on stare decisis and not interpretational
methodology.2 66
IV. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the concerns expressed by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Hubbard decision did not damage the doctrine of stare decisis. The Hub-
bard Court justifiably corrected Bramblett's erroneous interpretation of
§ 1001. Our system of checks and balances is designed such that the will
of the people should be fulfilled through their chosen representatives
who enact the laws of the land. It is therefore imperative that the judici-
ary remain faithful to its solemn trust to interpret the law, not create it.
This can be accomplished by construing the laws as they are written, not
by how a particular judge thinks they should have been written.
The Hubbard decision gave Congress notice that it must be explicit in
its intentions when drafting legislation. While the amendment to 18
U.S.C. § 1001 explicitly encompasses all three branches of government,
and addresses the concerns expressed by the legal community, it creates
some ambiguities that will force the courts once again to interpret some
of its terms and construe its scope. And thus, we inevitably return to the
institutional tension inherent in our system of government.
Christopher E. Dominguez
264. Cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (arguing that the Immigration and Naturalization Service's interpretation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act is not reasonable and therefore not entitled to deference
because its interpretation is not supported by the plain meaning and structure of the statu-
tory text).
265. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 922 n.2 (providing a list of recent Supreme Court
cases focusing on the plain language of the text being interpreted). But see Bradley C.
Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construc-
tion, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 401 (1994) (proclaiming that Justice Scalia's "plain
meaning" approach to statutory interpretation "has not won general acceptance on the
Court").
266. See supra text accompanying notes 184-90 (providing the rationale underlying the
dissenting opinion).
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